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PARTIES TO THE PROCEEDING BELOW
The following parties or attorneys are now or have been
interested in this litigation or any related proceedings:
1.

First Security Mortgage Company ("First Security")

was the defendant below.

On June 3, 1988, Leucadia Financial

Corporation ("Leucadia") was substituted for First Security.
Leucadia claims rights to the Property through a contract for
purchase that was specifically made "subject to" the Lis Pendens
filed by the plaintiff*

First Security chose not to appeal and

conveyed the subject Property to the plaintiff pursuant to the
Trial Court's Decree of Specific Performance.
2.

Craig L. Taylor, Esq., Anthony B. Quinn, Esq:

and Jeffrey D. Eisenberg, Esq. of Ray, Quinney & Nebeker,
previously appeared as counsel for First Security before the
substitution of parties.
3.

Herbert S. Armstrong, William Melbourne Armstrong,

Jr., Joseph F. Ringholz and Raye C. Ringholz are defendants in
the action entitled First Security Mortgage Company v. Armstrong,
et a h , Civil No. 9447, filed July 10, 1987 in the Third Judicial
District Court in and for Summit County, State of Utah.

That

action seeks a decree of quiet title to the property that is
the subject of this action plus an additional 15.22 feet of
property that was not deeded to First Security because of an
erroneous property description, a decree of quiet title to all
water rights appurtenant to the property, actual damages and

punitive damages.

The defendants are represented by Robert M.

Felton, Esq.
4.

All other parties are reflected in the caption and

all other counsel have entered their appearance.
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NATURE OF PROCEEDINGS BELOW
Leucadia appeals

from the following

judgments and

orders:
1.

An Order of Partial Summary Judgment signed on

February 1, 1988 (R. 562-64);
2.

A

Final

Judgment

and

Decree

of

Specific

Performance signed on May 6, 1988 (R.815-24); and
3.

An Order signed on May 6, 1988.

(R.812-14)

These judgments and orders ordered First Security to
convey a home and the accompanying 11 acres of land to plaintiff
William R. Kelley, Jr.
Leucadia appealed on June 3, 1988, and on August 22,
1988, the Utah Supreme Court notified the parties that the case
was poured-over to the Court of Appeals for disposition.
JURISDICTION
This Court has jurisdiction over this appeal pursuant
to Rule 3(a) of the Rules of the Utah Supreme Court, in that it
is an appeal taken from a district court to the Supreme Court
from a final judgment and pursuant to the Supreme Court's transfer
of the appeal pursuant to Rule 4A(a) of the Rules of the Utah
Court of Appeals.
This case involves an appeal from a final judgment of
the Third Judicial District Court.
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ISSUES PRESENTED FOR REVIEW
Leucadia claims that the trial court erred in decreeing
specific

performance

property

to

Kelley

of First Security's Agreement to sell
on the ground that Kelley's

performance was ineffective and/or untimely.

tender of

Kelley submits

that the trial court did not err.
STATEMENT OF THE CASE
On March 2, 1987, plaintiff William R, Kelley, Jr.
("Kelley"), a resident of Hull, Massachusetts, agreed to purchase
from First Security Mortgage Company ("First Security"), a home
and approximately 11 acres of land in Park City, Utah (the
"Property") . The Property was circumscribed by natural boundaries
—

a spring and a stream —

and fences.

The home is located on

the edge of the stream, which feeds a trout pond and irrigates
pastures located on the Property.

At the time the Agreement

was made, both Kelley and First Security believed and intended
that, at closing, First Security would convey marketable title
to all of the land within the natural boundaries and fences.
Before the closing, which was to occur on or before
April 20, 1987, First Security learned that the deed through
which it took title contained an erroneous property description
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that did not coincide with the property that it intended to convey
and Kelley intended to receive. As a result, neither the spring
nor the stream could be included in First Security's conveyance.
In addition, the adjacent property owners, the Armstrongs, cutoff
the water supply to the pond and irrigation ditches and the pond
dried up.

Thus, if the Agreement had closed on April 20, 1987,

as agreed, Kelley would have received a home and grounds with a
discrepancy between the natural, intended and legal boundaries
and the deed description.

He would have also received a mud-

hole instead of a trout pond. More importantly, litigation with
the Armstrongs was not merely a possibility, but was virtually
certain.
Recognizing these problems, and hoping to salvage its
deal with Kelley, First Security spent the rest of the spring
and most of the summer of 1987 trying to resolve the problems.
Throughout this time, First Security and Kelley cooperated in
every respect. Kelley accepted First Security's offers to extend
the closing date on three occasions —

two of which were made

after the designated closing date had expired.

In addition,

Kelley, following First Security's advice, did not retain Utah
counsel since he was confident that First Security would resolve
the boundary and water problems and, once those problems were
resolved, the sale would close.
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First Security's

informal attempts to resolve the

problems were unsuccessful and on July 10, 1987, it filed a
Complaint against the Armstrongs claiming that the erroneous
legal description prevented it from conveying marketable title
to Kelley.

The Complaint also claimed that without the stream,

spring and trout pond, the Property's value, aesthetically and
economically, was substantially reduced.

In addition to seeking

reformation of the erroneous legal description, a decree quieting
title to the Property in First Security and a declaration that
First Security was the fee simple owner of all water rights
appurtenant to the Property, First Security's Complaint also
sought actual and punitive damages.
In late August or early September of 1988, First
Security's eagerness to sell the Property to Kelley and its
willingness to resolve the problems abruptly ceased when appellant
Leucadia Financial Corporation ("Leucadia") expressed an interest
in purchasing the Property directly from First Security-

By

selling the Property directly to Leucadia, First Security could
avoid paying a $45,000.00 real estate commission since its listing
agreement with Gump & Ayers had expired, it could negotiate its
way out of the Armstrong lawsuit and, at the same time, obtain
a higher, cash purchase price for the Property. However, before
these plums could be picked, First Security had to get rid of
Kelley who, at the time, still believed that he and First Security
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would

cooperate

Agreement.

in resolving the problems

and closing the

Kelley had not retained Utah counsel —

Security's advice —

on First

and he believed that a fourth extension of

the closing date would be signed shortly since the last extension
expired on August 31, 1987. He was wrong.
On Friday, September 4, 1987, First Security sent a
letter to Kelley demanding that the sale close by September 15,
1987, or First Security would consider the Agreement to be null
and void.

The letter advised Kelley to retain counsel and

"offered" to make title and water documents available for his
or his attorney's review.

The letter was sent over the Labor

Day weekend and Kelley did not receive it until September 8,
1987 —

leaving him only five business days to close the $650,000

purchase which was fraught with problems of First Security's
creation.

That day, he sent a telegram to First Security

indicating his continued desire to purchase the Property and
requesting a 30-day extension of the closing date since all
previous extensions sought by First Security had been for at
least 30 days. The next day he retained Utah counsel to evaluate
the problems.
In view of the complexity of the issues, it was readily
apparent to Kelley that First Security's closing demand was
unreasonable; nonetheless, Kelley's counsel made an appointment
with First Security's counsel for September 10, 1987, to review
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the documents concerning the water and boundary problems. First
Security's lawyers failed to keep the appointment, but offered
a conciliatory, albeit meaningless, extension of its demanded
closing date for an additional week to September 22, 1987,

By

that date, the documents still had not been provided.
Kelley was left with three options: (1) accept a return
of his earnest money deposit, absorb his losses and walk away
from a purchase he truly wanted to make; (2) accept a deed, pay
the full purchase price and waive all claims against First
Security — pursuant to either the merger doctrine or the express
waiver demanded by First Security —

despite the fact that First

Security admitted in the Armstrong Complaint that the Property
was less valuable due to the boundary and water problems; or
(3) ask the court to require a conveyance to him of First
Security's interest in the Property and interpret the Agreement
to determine whether an adjustment in the sales price was
warranted under the terms of the Agreement. The first two options
required

Kelley

to

accept

First

Security's

unilateral

interpretation of what was required of it under the Agreement,
while the third option vested that interpretation where it
properly belonged —

with the court.

Needless to say, Kelley selected option (3) and filed
this action on September 22, 1987, seeking a decree requiring
First Security to convey to him whatever interest it had and a
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declaration of the parties' rights and obligations under the
Agreement. The Complaint also sought an abatement of the purchase
price and damages, if appropriate.1

Kelley also tendered his

$124,000 down payment into escrow along with a demand that First
Security perform as agreed and intended by the parties. He also
caused a Lis Pendens to be recorded. In response, First Security
agreed to extend the closing date to October 8, 1987, if Kelley
agreed to purchase the Property "as is" and release his claims
against First Security.

Kelley refused and transferred his

significant down payment to the Clerk of the Court. 2

First

Security declared that the Agreement was void.
On September 25, 1987, Leucadia made its first formal
offer to purchase the Property and on November 25, 1987, the
sale to Leucadia closed; however, the sale was expressly made
subject to the prior rights of Kelley.
The Agreement between Leucadia and First Security
provides that if First Security loses this lawsuit, First Security
must return with interest any money received from Leucadia and
must indemnify Leucadia for all of its costs and expenses incurred
1

First Security and Kelley have settled the issues of
an abatement of the purchase price, damages and attorneys' fees.
Kelley has released First Security from those claims and First
Security has deeded the Property to Kelley.
2
To the credit of the Summit County Treasurer, he was
able to invest the tender and earn an 8.61% annual return which
was almost 2% better than banks were paying on money market
accounts during the same period of time.
-7-

as a result of its purchase of the Property,

In other words,

Leucadia contracted to be made whole when Kelley received the
Property.
First Security filed a Motion to Dismiss Kelley's
Complaint and Kelley filed a Cross-Motion for Partial Summary
Judgment. Both motions were supported by Affidavits. On December
6, 1987, Kelley's Motion was granted and First Security's Motion
was denied.

On January 20, 1988, the court entered an Order

that Kelley was entitled to a decree of specific performance
requiring First Security to convey its interest in the Property,
but retained jurisdiction to determine, among other things, the
rights and obligations of the parties under the Agreement and
whether Kelley was entitled to an abatement of the purchase price
and/or damages. The Order stated that First Security's conveyance
could wait until final judgment was entered.
Final judgment was entered on May 6, 1988, and First
Security conveyed to Kelley the Property that it owned by special
warranty

deed

plus

the

15.22

feet caused

by the boundary

discrepancy by quit-claim deed. Kelley and his family now occupy
the Property.

On June 3, 1988, Leucadia was substituted as

defendant for First Security and filed this appeal.
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STATEMENT OF THE FACTS
1.

The Agreement Between Kelley and First Security.
a.

On or about March 2, 1987,3 Kelley, as buyer,

and First Security, as seller, executed an Earnest Money Sales
Agreement for the purchase of residential property located at
320 Snows Lane, Park City, Utah. (R.14-22)
b.

The Agreement contains the following terms:
(1)

"Condition and Conveyance

of Title.

Seller represents that Seller holds title to the property in
fee simple.

Transfer of Seller's ownership interest shall be

made as set forth in Section S.

Seller agrees to furnish good

and marketable title to the property, subject to encumbrances
and exceptions noted herein, evidenced by a current policy of
title insurance in the amount of purchase price." (R.14
(2)

3)

"Property sold xas is' without warranty.

Title conveyed by special warranty deed corp form.

Other terms

to remain the same." (R.14)
(3)

"Current

certified

survey

will

be

provided by Seller." (R.18)
(4)

"Closing to be on or before April 20,

1987." (R.18)

^The Earnest Money Agreement is dated February 20, 1987;
however, an agreement between the parties was not reached until
March 2, 1987.
-9-

(5)
c.

"Time is of the essence." (R.17

Q)

Other relevant terms of the Agreement are

as set forth in Leucadia's Brief, pages 3-6.
d.

In reliance on the Agreement, Kelley deposited

$10,000 with Gump & Ayers and began arranging the funds necessary
by liquidating assets.
2.

(R.276)

The Property in Dispute.
a.

At the time the Agreement was signed, both

Kelley and First Security understood the Property to consist of
a residence surrounded by approximately 11 acres of grounds. The
grounds are substantially enclosed by fences, a spring and a
stream.

The home is situated on the edge of the stream, which

feeds the pond and irrigates the pastures located on the Property.
(R.207-08, 275)
b.

Shortly after the Agreement wcis signed, First

Security, in accordance with the Agreement, had the Property
surveyed.
it

The survey revealed that the quit-claim deed by which

acquired

its

interest

contained

an

erroneous

property

description that placed the boundaries of the Property 15.22
feet farther south than the actual Property which First Security
and its predecessors occupied and intended to convey.
c.

As

a

result

of

the

erroneous

(R.23-58)
property

description, the spring and the stream could not be conveyed by
First Security to Kelley. (R.194-95)
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d.

Moreover, after the Agreement was executed,

the adjacent property owners sawed off a pipe supplying water
to the pond and removed fish from the pond. (R.82) Consequentlyf
the pond dried up and there was no irrigation water.
3.

(R.82)

The Extension of the Agreement to Resolve Boundary
and Water Rights Problems.
a.

First Security recognized that the boundary

and water problems affected not only the value of the Property,
but also its ability to convey marketable title. To give it time
to resolve these problems, First Security, on April 22, 1987—
two days after the initial closing date had expired — requested
that the closing date be extended to June 1, 1987. Kelley agreed
to the request. (R.19, 277
b.

On

8)

May

28,

1987, First

Security

again

requested that the closing date be extended to July 1, 1987.
Kelley agreed to the request. (R.20)
c.

On July 6, 1987 —

closing date had expired —

five days after the extant

First Security again requested that

the closing date be extended, this time to August 31, 1987.
Kelley agreed to the request. (R.21)
d.

First

Security was

unable to

informally

resolve the boundary and water problems with the Armstrongs and
on July 10, 1987, it filed a Complaint in the Third Judicial
District Court, entitled First Security Mortgage Co. v. Herbert
S. Armstrong, et al. , Civil No. 9447 (the "Armstrong Suit").
-11-

First Security sought the following relief:

(1) quiet title

to the Property and correction of the erroneous legal description
so

that

the

property

description

would

match

the

natural

boundaries; (2) a declaration that First Security was the fee
simple owner of all water rights appurtenant to the Property;
(3) damages resulting from drainage of the trout pond; (4)
punitive damages in the amount of $50,000; and (5) attorneys'
fees, costs and expenses. (R.23-59)
e.

In its Complaint, First Security claimed

that because of the erroneous legal description, it could not
convey marketable title to the Property and that the Property's
value had been substantially reduced, both aesthetically and
economically, because of the loss of the stream, spring and trout
pond. (R.29-31)
f.

Throughout this period, First Security told

Kelley that it was not necessary for him to retain Utah counsel.
(R.289)
4.

The Dispute Between Kelley and First Security.
a.

On

September

4,

1987, First

Security's

attorney, Craig Taylor, Esq., sent a letter to Kelley demanding
that the sale close by September 15, 1987, or First Security
would consider the Agreement to be null and void. First Security
also informed Kelley for the first time that he should obtain
legal counsel.

(R.114-15)

Before he received the September 4
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letter, Kelley was under the impression that First Security was
doing its best, including filing the Armstrong Suit, to clear
up the boundary and water problems. (R.277-78)
b.

The September 4 letter was sent over the

Labor Day weekend and Kelley, a resident of Hull, Massachusetts,
did not receive it until September 8, 1987, (R.278)
c.

On September 9, Kelley retained David R.

Olsen, Esq., of the firm of Suitter Axland Armstrong & Hanson,
to serve as his counsel in his transaction with First Security.
(R.278)

On that day, Kelley sent a telegram to First Security

stating that he did not want to walk away from the Property and
that he needed a customary 30-day extension before he could close.
(R.288-89)
d.

Kelley's Utah counsel immediately contacted

First Security's counsel.

First Security agreed to provide all

of the documents concerning the boundary and water problems for
review so that Kelley could make an informed decision regarding
the Property.

An appointment was made for the production of

those documents. (R.282-83)
e.

On September 10, 1987, Dan W. Egan, Esq.,

of Suitter Axland Armstrong & Hanson, went to First Security's
counsel's office to obtain copies of all documents in First
Security's possession concerning the boundary and water problems.
Mr. Taylor failed to keep the appointment. (R.282-83)
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f.

As a result of his failure to keep the

appointment with Mr. Egan, Mr. Taylor extended th€> deadline for
closing to September 22, 1987.

(R.116) The requested documents

were not provided by that date; nevertheless, Kelley wired
approximately $124,000 into an account at Williamsburg Savings
Bank so that the necessary funds would be available for the
closing.

(R.278-80) Kelley's attorney informed Taylor by letter

that Kelley was ready, willing and able to close the Agreement,
that the funds necessary for the down payment were on deposit
with Williamsburg Savings Bank and he demanded that First Security
perform as agreed. (R.119-21)
g.

On September 22, 1987, this action was filed

seeking a declaration of the rights of the parties pursuant to
the Agreement and a decree of specific performance requiring
First Security to convey the Property subject to Kelley's claim
for damages.

(R.l-62)

A Lis Pendens was filed the same day.

The escrow funds were subsequently deposited with the Summit
County Clerk.

(R.68)
h.

On September 22, 1987, First Security declared

the Agreement null and void and, on September 24, 1987, executed
the release of Kelley's $10,000 earnest money deposit.
23)

(R.122-

Kelley refused to accept the release.
i.

On September 25, 1987, Leucadia offered to

purchase the Property from First Security.

-14-

The earnest money

Agreement between Leucadia

and First Security, as amended,

provides in part: (1) that Leucadia would pay a purchase price
of $675,000, cash upon closing; (2) that if Leucadia purchased
the Property, First Security would "use its best efforts to obtain
a settlement, dismissal with prejudice or final judgment" in
the lawsuit with Kelley in First Security's favor; (3) that if
First Security lost the lawsuit, and the Property was conveyed
to Kelley, that First Security would indemnify Leucadia for all
of its costs and expenses incurred as a result of its purchase
of the Property; and (4) that if Leucadia were brought into this
lawsuit by the plaintiff or any other party, First Security would
pay Leucadia's

litigation costs, including attorneys' fees,

(R.312, 493-514)
j.

On January 10, 1988, the trial court entered

an Order granting Kelley's Motion for Partial Summary Judgment
and ordering First Security to convey the Property-

The court

retained jurisdiction over Kelley's claim to an abatement of
the purchase price, damages and attorneys' fees. The conveyance
was ordered to occur when final judgment was entered in this
action-

(R.562-64)
k.

(R.815-24)

On May 6, 1988, Final Judgment was entered.

First Security accepted the moneys deposited with

the court and conveyed the Property that it owned to Kelley by
special warranty deed and the 15.22 foot discrepancy caused by
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the erroneously legal description by quit-claim deed.

(See

Appendix "A," attached hereto.)
1.

On June 3, 1988, Leucadia was substituted

as defendant in this action and filed this appeal.

(R.844-46,

847-49)
SUMMARY OF THE ARGUMENT
Kelley submits that the trial court did not err in
granting his motion for Partial Summary Judgment ordering First
Security to specifically perform the Agreement to the extent
that it could perform, while reserving Kelley's claim for an
abatement in the purchase price and/or damages for trial.
Leucadia argues that the trial court's decision granting
a decree of specific performance to Kelley should be reversed on
the ground that Kelley's tender was untimely and/or ineffective.
As will be demonstrated below, Kelley's tender was
neither untimely nor ineffective.

In fact, it was unnecessary.

The undisputed facts before the trial court concerning the conduct
of the parties mandated a holding that the "time is of the
essence" provision was waived.

As such, First Security, before

it could claim that Kelley had breached the Agreement, was not
only required to provide Kelley notice and a reasonable time to
close, but also to tender its own performance.

The undisputed

facts showed that the seven days provided by First Security was
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unreasonable — these facts were untraversed below. Thus, Kelley
was not in breach of the Agreement when he deposited his down
payment into court and, through his Complaint, asked the Court
to require First Security to convey whatever property it owned
that was subject to the Agreement and interpret whether the
Agreement required First Security to convey the property free
of the water and boundary problems.

If so, Kelley would be

entitled to an abatement of the purchase price; if not, the full
purchase price would be paid.
Alternatively, Kelley claims that First Security could
not convey marketable title which was required by the Agreement.
First Security's inability to perform, relieved Kelley of the duty
to tender his performance.
Third,

the

"tender" attacked

ineffective because it is conditional.

by

Leucadia

is not

It merely demanded First

Security to perform as it had agreed to perform, that is, convey
marketable title to the Property with all the pertinent water
rights.

It was submitted in conjunction with the filing of a

lawsuit which asked the court to interpret the Agreement and
structure the appropriate decree.
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ARGUMENT
I.
INTRODUCTION
This appeal must be viewed in light of the interests
of Leucadia.

It is not being pursued by First Security —

First

Security accepted the judgment below by accepting the money
deposited with the Clerk of the Court and delivering its deeds
to Kelley.

Rather, the appeal is being pursued by Leucadia—

an interloper whose contract reveals that it took its interest
in the Property with express and full notice of Kelley's prior
rights.

More importantly, it entered into a deal where it has

nothing to lose.
Leucadia's contract with First Security specifically
provides that Leucadia will be fully indemnified for any losses,
including attorneys' fees, engineering fees, costs and interest,
if Kelley prevails in this lawsuit. Leucadia also delegated the
duty to pursue the lawsuit to First Security.
Leucadia's contract was so precise that it designated
the interest rate to be paid on all indemnified funds as the
prime interest rate as was charged from time to time by Chase
Manhattan Bank during the same time period.

It is with this

background that Leucadia seeks to disrupt the lives of the Kelley
family and continue with litigation which the parties below wished
to end.
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The arguments raised by Leucadia seek to divert this
court's attention from the import of what really happened below.
What has never been disputed is that Bill Kelley wanted to move
his family to Utah.

He found property he liked, he paid for it

and he was willing to fight for it.
never at issue —

His financial ability was

it couldn't be because his money was on deposit

with the court. Nor has it ever been disputed that Kelley relied
on the Agreement with First Security to his detriment since he
liquidated assets to meet the down payment.
Instead of addressing these issues, Leucadia attempts
to elevate the chaos created by First Security to a justifiable
excuse for First Security's dishonoring of the Kelley Agreement
and taking a better deal.
First Security encountered a problem with marketable
title and couldn't deliver what it had agreed to deliver. It told
Kelley not to retain a lawyer and attempted to solve the problem
without his assistance or input.

After over five months of

failure, First Security tried to pass the problem on to Kelley
and demanded that he give up his rights to question whether First
Security

had

honored

its

Agreement.

Even

under

these

circumstances, Kelley was willing to pay the price and take the
Property.
declaratory

He sought only to have the court determine through a
judgment

action

if First

Security's

interpretation of the Agreement was correct.
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unilateral

If it wasn't

correct, Kelley sought the appropriate adjustment to the purchase
price; if it was, Kelley would pay the full purchase price.
In its effort to champion rights which the parties to
the Agreement have long since resolved, Leucadia conducts a
somewhat misleading discussion of the "tender letter." It focuses
on one sentence and seeks to disregard every other word of the
letter as well as the facts of the transaction.

The letter is

three pages and it was delivered in conjunction with the filing
of the Complaint.

It recites the history of the transaction

and discusses the missed appointments and First Security's failure
to deliver promised deeds and closing documents.

It states that

the closing date is unreasonable and petitions First Security
for a reasonable time period within which to close.

That is

the substance of the letter.
The letter cannot be separated from the Complaint which
was filed on the same date.
court —

The Complaint seeks to have the

not First Security —

determine the meaning of the

Agreement and award judgment consistent with its interpretation.
There was no risk to First Security because the required down
payment was placed under the control of the court to distribute
consistent with its judgment.

It is difficult to imagine a

situation where the right to have the court interpret an Agreement
is more appropriate.

Kelley's rights would have been lost or

compromised if he closed pursuant to First Security's demand
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since the Agreement specifically provided that its terms were
merged into the deed.

Kelley showed his willingness to close

by giving the court control of the $124,000 down payment.
If Mr. Kelley cannot petition a court for assistance
under these circumstances, the remedy of a declaratory judgment
is meaningless. The mighty's judgment becomes infallible because
the time, expense and risks of litigation allow those in Mr.
Kelley's situation to be bludgeoned into submission. This is not
a policy the law should promote.

For these and the reasons

discussed below, the trial court's decision was guided by common
sense and fairness and was correct under the law.
II.
EVEN THOUGH THE AGREEMENT BETWEEN KELLEY AND
FIRST SECURITY STATED THAT "TIME IS OF THE
ESSENCE," THIS PROVISION WAS WAIVED BY
THE CONDUCT OF THE PARTIES.
Time is of the essence in a land sale contract only
if the parties so intend.
may

be

demonstrated

by

That intention, or the lack thereof,
a

contract

circumstances of the transaction.

provision

or

by

the

Barker v. Francis, 741 P.2d

548 (Utah Ct. App. 1987), citing. Century 21 All Western Real
Estate v. Webb, 645 P.2d 52 (Utah 1982); Cahoon v. Cahoon, 641
P.2d 140 (Utah 1982); Huck v. Haves, 560 P.2d 1124 (Utah 1977).
It follows that a specified time for performance may be waived
by the conduct of the parties, thereby indicating that time is
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not of the essence —

despite a contrary contract provision.

Huck v. Haves, 560 P.2d at 1126; Cline v. Hullum, 435 P.2d 152
(Okla. 1967).
For example, in Schwoyer v. Fenstermacher, 380 A.2d 468
(Pa. Super. Ct. 1977), the sales agreement stated that time was
of

the

essence;

however,

because

the

title

searches

were

incomplete by the closing date, the parties extended the.closing
date for six weeks.

At the end of the six weeks, the title

searches were still incomplete.

When the seller was told of

the new delay, he didn't object.

When the title searches were

completed nearly two months later, the seller informed the
purchasers that the agreement was "null and void."

Id. at 470.

The court held that the seller had waived the provision that
time was of the essence:
Even though the agreement of sale makes time
of "the essence of the contract" this
provision may be waived by agreement or by
the conduct of the parties. . . . We find
that appellant's
[seller's] actions
demonstrated that she "affirmatively assented"
to settlement being held at some date later
than January 14, depending on when Merkel
[the attorney conducting the title searches]
completed the title searches.
Id. at 470.
First Security waived the "time is of the essence"
provision when it asked for and Kelley granted three successive
extensions of the closing date —

two of which were offered and

accepted after the closing date had expired.
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Throughout the

period when First Security asked for extensions in order to
resolve the boundary and water problems, the parties intended
to carry out the terms of the Agreement for sale of the Property
as soon as the problems were remedied.

First Security even

advised Kelley that it was unnecessary for him to retain counsel.
Thus, Leucadia's "time is of essence" argument supporting First
Security's termination of the Agreement is unsupported.
III.
BECAUSE THE "TIME IS OF ESSENCE" PROVISION
WAS WAIVED, FIRST SECURITY WAS REQUIRED TO
GIVE KELLEY A REASONABLE TIME IN WHICH TO PERFORM
After compliance with the closing date is waived, the
time

for closing becomes

indefinite

and the party

seeking

performance must give notice and a reasonable period of time
for the other party to perform before the Agreement is breached.
In Tanner v. Baadsqaard, 612 P.2d 345 (Utah 1980),
plaintiff

(the assignee of the purchasers) sued for specific

performance of a contract for the sale of undeveloped property.
The plaintiff, over a period of several months, attempted to
arrange financing for the purchase. During this period, several
payments due under the contract were not made. Plaintiff informed
the vendor several times of the assignment of the original
purchaser's interest and of the fact that the plaintiff was having
difficulty with financing and the defendant didn't complain about
the delay.

When the plaintiff finally arranged financing and
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informed the vendor so that a closing date could be arranged,
the vendor told plaintiff that he planned to sell the property
to a third party and that he would not accept any money from
the plaintiff.

The Utah Supreme Court upheld the trial court's

finding that:
[By] His conduct, the defendant had waived
requirement of strict compliance with the
dates of payment stated in the earnest money
agreement . . . The court applied the rule
that after such a waiver, the seller must give
notice and a reasonable time to perform
before he may insist upon holding the buyer
strictly to the time requirements- The trial
court concluded that the plaintiff would be
entitled to specific performance of the
contract. . .
Id. at 347.

See also, Three-O-Three Investments, Inc., v.

Moffitt, 622 S.W.2d 736 (Mo. Ct. App. 1981); Cline v. Hullum,
435 P.2d 152 (Ofcla. 1967); Schwoyer v. Fenstermacher, 380 A.2d
468 (Pa. Super. Ct. 1977).
First Security, by its letter dated September 4, 1987,
did not provide Kelley with a reasonable time to perform.

The

letter, mailed to Kelley in Massachusetts over the Labor Day
weekend, informed Kelley that "First Security had no intention
of proceeding with the Armstrong lawsuit, advised him to get
counsel —

despite its prior advice to the contrary —

and

demanded that the sale close on or before September 15, 1987.
Thus, Kelley had only five business days to engage an attorney,
to come to Utah and to close on the Property.
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Keilley stated in

his Affidavit filed in support of his Motion for Partial Summary
Judgment that First Security's denial provided him an unreasonable
period

of

time

untraversed

by

to

evaluate

First

the problems.

Security.

This

Further, First

fact was
Security's

preemptory notice sharply contrasted with the parties' prior
conduct since no previous extension had been for less than 30
days.
On September 9, 1987, Kelley retained Utah counsel
and an appointment was made for Kelley's counsel to review First
Security's files. First Security failed to keep the appointment
but extended the closing deadline to September 22, 1987, and
committed to provide by that date information, title opinions
and research on the water and boundary problems.

By the time

First Security terminated the Agreement, no such information
had been provided for Kelley's review nor had First Security
tendered a deed to Kelley which was a requirement to closing
under

any

interpretation

of

the

Agreement.

Under

these

circumstances, Kelley acted reasonably in refusing to close on
First Security's terms.
It follows that after Kelley failed to close the
Agreement on September 22, 1987, he did not breach the Agreement,
and when

he

deposited

his

down payment

in the amount of

$124,408.86 into court on October 9, 1987, First Security's duty
of performance arose..

The down payment was transferred from
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escrow and tendered into court 31 days after the receipt of First
Security's September 4 letter. The first two extensions offered
by First Security and accepted by Kelley were 30-day extensions,
while the last such extension was a 60-day extension.

Clearly,

when reiewed in the light of the past history, missed appointments
and unobtained documents, Kelley's tender 31 days after "First
Security's precipitous and unexpected demand to close was not
unreasonable. In fact, First Security made no effort to traverse
the affirmative, sworn stipulation of Mr. Kelley relating to
unreasonableness of the closing demand.
IV.
FIRST SECURITY BREACHED THE AGREEMENT
BETWEEN THE PARTIES
A.

The Agreement Required First Security to Fujrnish Good and
Marketable Title to the Property.
The Agreement between Kelley and First Security provided

that First Security would furnish good and marketable title to
the Property.

Section 3 of the Agreement (R.16) provides as

follows:
Seller represents that Seller holds title to
the property in fee simple. Transfer of Seller's
ownership interests shall be made as set forth
in Section F. Seller agrees to furnish good
and marketable title to the property, subject
to encumbrances and exceptions noted herein,
evidenced by a current policy of title insurance
in the amount of the purchase price.
For title to property to be marketable, "stitle must
be such as to make it reasonably certain that it will not be
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called into question in the future so as to subject the purchaser
to the hazard of litigation with reference thereto.'" Hedaecock
v. Stewart Title Guar. Co., 676 P.2d 1208, 1210 (Colo. Ct. App.
1983), citing, Morlev v. Gieseker, 142 Colo. 490, 351 P.2d 392
(1960).

See also, Edwards v. St. Paul Title Insurance Co., 563

P.2d 979 (Colo. Ct. App. 1977); Michaelson v. Tieman, 541 P.2d
91 (Colo. Ct. App. 1975); Darby v. Keeran, 211 Kan. 133, 505
P.2d 710 (Kan. 1973).
An

erroneous

property

description

renders

title

unmarketable. In Hedaecock v. Stewart Title Guar. Co., the court
held that title was unmarketable where the property description
used by the title company in its policy of insurance was faulty
in a number of respects, including a metes and bounds description
from which it was impossible to determine the property's location
on the ground.

The trial court concluded that "xthe uncertainty

caused by the description is so great that a failure of title
to the property occurs,' and
was a possibility.'"

s

[1]itigation over the property

676 P.2d at 1210.

Similarly, in Michaelson v. Tieman, 541 P. 2d 91 (Colo.
Ct. App. 1975), another case involving a faulty metes and bounds
description, the court stated as follows:
The standard to be applied in disputes of
this type is not that the complainant must
show a "reasonable probability of litigation"
in order to have title held unmarketable,
but rather that the party asserting the
validity of the title must show with
-27-

reasonable certainty that litigation will
not occur, "The title must be such as to
make it reasonably certain that it will not
be called into question in the future so as
to subject the purchaser to the hazard of
litigation with reference thereto."
Id. at 92.
By First Security's own admission in the Armstrong
Complaint, title to the Property was unmarketable. Paragraph 17
alleges as follows:
17. As the result of a discrepancy between
the description of the Subject Property contained
in plaintiff's Quit-Claim Deed and the actual
property occupied by the Princes [First
Security's predecessors], enclosed by fences,
and bounded in part by a spring and ditch,
plaintiff was, and is, unable to convey
marketable title to the Subject Property.
(R.29-30)
The Complaint further alleges the Armstrongs refused
to exchange deeds as requested by First Security, allegedly for
the purpose of frustrating First Security's sale of the Property.
(R.30)
These allegations indicate that on April 20, 1987, First
Security believed that it was required to provide marketable
title which was precluded by the boundary and water problems.
Obviously, if First Security felt that title was marketable
irrespective of the boundary or water problems or that it had
no obligation to furnish marketable title, it would not have
filed the Armstrong Suit.
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Moreover, the very fact that the Armstrong Suit existed
is clear evidence that the hazard of litigation was not merely
a possibility, but rather, a reality.

Given this circumstance,

First Security could not convey marketable title as provided
in the Agreement between the parties.
Leucadia argues that the hand-written phrase inserted
in paragraph 11 of the Agreement relieved First Security of the
requirement to furnish marketable title:
is' without warranty.
Corp. Form." (R.16)

"property sold

x

as

Title conveyed by Special Warranty Deed

First Security fails to point out that the

hand-written insertion also provides that "[all] other terms
to remain the same."
Contrary to Leucadia's assertion, the hand-written
provision that the conveyance will be by "special warranty deed"
and that the property is sold "as is without warranty" did not
alter First Security's obligation to furnish marketable title.
In the context of agreements for the purchase of real property,
a promise to furnish marketable title is entirely compatible with
conveyance by warranty deed, special warranty deed or quit-claim
deed. In other words, a provision requiring the seller to furnish
marketable title does not necessarily imply that the seller must
convey the property by warranty deed only.

Department of Public

Works and Buildings v. Halls, 220 N.E.2d 167 (111. 1966); Lininaer
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v. Blackhills Greyhound Racing Association, 149 N.W.2d 413 (S.
D. 1967).
Similarly, if the seller agrees to convey only by a
quit-claim deed, an implied covenant that title will be marketable
is not negated.
1912).

Wallach v. Riverside Bank, 100 N.E. 50 (N.Y.

Thus, First Security's insertion in the Agreement that

it will convey title by special warranty deed, corporate form,
is compatible with the provision in paragraph 3 of the Agreement
that it must furnish marketable title.
Nor does the fact that First Security agreed to sell
the

property

"as

is

without

warranty"

relieve

requirement that it convey marketable title.

it

of

the

The insertion of

"as is without warranty" can only refer to the physical condition
or habitability of the property and not to any implied warranties
of title, as Leucadia seems to argue.

From the time that a

contract for the sale of real property is executed, and continuing
up to the time when the deed is delivered and accepted, there are
no implied warranties of title that can be disclaimed.

Indeed,

the seller need not even have title to the property at the time
the contract for sale is executed.

"[T]he law does not require

the vendor to have clear and marketable title at all times during
the performance of his contract, and is not ordinarily so obliged
until the time comes for him to perform."

Corporation Nine v.

Taylor, 30 Utah 2d 47, 513 P.2d 417, 421 (1973).

-30-

See also.

Callister v. Millstream Associates, Inc., 738 P.2d 662 (Utah
Ct. App. 1987) (seller does not have to have marketable title
during the executory period of a contract).
Because there

are no

implied warranties of title

associated with the contract of sale, the only warranties that
can be disclaimed by a seller at the time the contract of sale
is

executed

are

the

warranties

of

habitability,

good

and

workmanlike construction or compliance with building codes.
All of these warranties concern the physical condition of the
property, not the status of its title.

See Schepps v. Howe,

665 P.2d 504 (Wyo. 1983); Schoeneweis v. Herrin, 443 N.E.2d 36
(111. App. 1982); Tibbitts v. Qpenshaw, 425 P.2d 160 (Utah 1967);
Mulkev v. Waggoner, 338 S.E.2d 755 (Ga. App. 1985).
Moreover, if the

"as is without warranty" clause

referred to warranties of title which, as shown above, it cannot,
it would be inconsistent with First Security's promise to convey
by special warranty deed.
B.

Failure of the Seller to Deliver Marketable Title Constitutes
a Breach of the Seller's Contract.
Because the boundary line and water rights problems

existed, First Security was unable to furnish marketable title.
This failure constituted a breach of the Agreement, Willcox
Clinic, Ltd., v. Evans Products Co., 136 Ariz. 400, 666 P.2d
500 (Ariz. Ct. App. 1983) reh'g denied, thereby rendering any
tender of performance by Kelley unnecessary.
-31-

Leucadia also argues that First Security merely agreed
to convey property located at 320 Snows Lane in Park City, Utah,
and that by describing the property by its address, First
Security made no representations concerning the location of
boundary lines or water rights.

Accordingly, First Security

asserts that it was capable of delivering clear title to the
land that it agreed to convey, whether the northern property
line was

15.22 feet farther to the north or to the south.

Further, according to Leucadia, since water rights are real
property and are conveyed with the land unless expressly reserved
by the grantor, and since no representations were made concerning
which water rights were appurtenant to the property, Kelley merely
contracted to buy whatever water rights existed.
The fact that property subject to a purchase agreement
is described in the Agreement by its street address does not
negate the seller's obligation to convey the property that the
parties agreed constitutes the subject of their agreement.

The

terms of an agreement must only be reasonably certain so as to
allow the parties to know what is required of them and definite
enough to allow courts to delineate the intent of the contracting
parties.

Reed v. Alvev, 610 P.2d

1374 (Utah 1980).

Any

ambiguities inherent in the language used to describe the property
being sold may be explained by extrinsic evidence as to the
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parties' intent.

Continental Bank & Trust Co. v. Stewart, 4

Utah 2d 228, 291 P.2d 890 (1955).
In Reed v. Alvey, the contract described the property
as the "corner of Hillview and Ninth East."

The purchaser sued

for specific performance of the contract, but the trial court
found in favor of the defendant on the ground that the contract
was too vague to be enforced by a decree of specific performance.
The Utah Supreme Court reversed.

Although conceding that the

description "corner of Hillview and Ninth East" was vague and
incomplete on its face, the Supreme Court held that the extrinsic
evidence presented by the plaintiff concerning the transaction
defined the subject matter in question in sufficient detail to
support a decree of specific performance.

According to the

Court:
Thus, everyone connected with the deal knew
what land was involved and the ambiguous
nature of the terms used in the written
agreement when viewed in light of the
extraneous evidence presented at trial does
not render the contract unenforceable or
defeat an action for specific performance.
Id. at 1378.
In Barker v. Francis, 741 P.2d 548 (Utah Ct. App. 1987),
the plaintiff and a group of doctors agreed to a land exchange.
The earnest money agreement stated that the doctors would purchase
the plaintiff's Nine-Mile Ranch along with 80 acres of plaintiff's
150-acre farm and 180 shares of water stock, but it didn't
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describe which 80 acres the plaintiff was to convey. The doctors
failed to perform and, at trial, claimed that the agreement was
too indefinite to enforce.

The trial court and this Court

disagreed holding that the contract need not contain every
particular of the agreement; rather, the crucial factor is that
the parties agreed on each essential element of the agreement.
Accordingly, this Court held that the trial court properly
received extrinsic evidence to show that the parties had agreed
that a specific 80 acres owned by plaintiff were to be transferred
to the doctors.
First

Security's

Complaint

against

the Armstrongs

repeatedly asserts that First Security owned and intended to
convey to Kelley, that land "substantially enclosed by fences,
a spring and a ditch," along with sufficient water rights to
maintain the aesthetics of the Property. Thus, it was undisputed
before the trial court that the address used in the Agreement
to describe the Property was intended by the parties to include
that land substantially enclosed by fences, a spring and a ditch
with all appurtenant water rights, and it is that Property that
First Security was obligated to convey.
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V.
KELLEY'S TENDER OF THE DOWN PAYMENT FOR THE PROPERTY,
RATHER THAN BEING IMPERFECT, AS DEFENDANT ASSERTS, WAS
NOT EVEN REQUIRED SINCE DEFENDANT FAILED TO PERFORM
The law does not require a contracting party to do a
"useless act and tender performance where the other contracting
party cannot or will not perform his part of the agreement . "
Barker v. Francis, 741 P.2d 548 (Utah Ct. App. 1987), citing
Jenson v. Richens, 442 P.2d 636, 639 (Wash. 1968) (Where vendors
had undertaken to deliver an encumbrance-free title, the court
held that the promise to furnish good title is a condition
precedent to the promise to purchase.).

See also, McFadden v.

Wilder, 6 Ariz. App. 60, 429 P. 2d 694 (Ariz. Ct. App. 1967) (Where
the seller does not tender marketable title, the duty of the
purchaser to tender performance does not arise; the seller is,
therefore, not excused from performance).
In Huck v. Haves, 560 P.2d

1124

(Utah 1977) the

purchaser sued to compel specific performance of an agreement
to purchase residential property.
the defendant would

The agreement provided that

furnish marketable

insurance policy in the purchaser's name.

title with

a title

Upon receipt of the

title insurance policy, however, the real estate broker realized
that the property was burdened by a federal tax lien and several
other exceptions to title.

The broker contacted each party

regarding these title problems and she was instructed to resolve
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them as soon as possible.

On the original closing date, the

purchaser had sufficient funds to make the payment required by
the agreement but did not tender payment. After several meetings
and a delay of six weeks, the real estate broker informed the
vendor that all of the problems had been resolved and that closing
could be accomplished at any time.

It was at that time that

the vendor first indicated that he was no longer interested in
closing the transaction.

About a month later, the real estate

broker again contacted the vendor to secure the closing.

The

vendor then stated that since the purchaser had failed to make
the payment required by the contract on the first closing date,
he recognized no further obligations under the contract.

Upon

the vendor's continued refusal to cooperate, the purchaser sued
for specific performance.
The Utah Court of Appeals upheld the trial court's finding
that the vendor could not demand payment from the purchaser since
furnishing marketable title was a condition precedent to any such
demand:
Inasmuch as under the contract it was the
defendant's responsibility to furnish good
title and a title insurance policy, the
furnishing thereof was a condition precedent
to his right to demand payment from the
purchaser (plaintiff).
It is fundamental that a party to a contract
should obtain no advantage from the fact that
he is himself unable to perform. Since the
defendant had not come forth with the agreed
title insurance policy demonstrating that he
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could convey a clear and marketable title as
of the proposed closing date, March 8, 1974,
he could neither demand payment by the
plaintiff on that date, nor claim that the
latter was in default for failing to make
the payment.
Id.at 1126.

See also, Fischer v. Johnson, 525 P.2d 45 (Utah

1974); Cumminas v. Nielson, 42 Utah 157, 129 P. 619 (1912).
In this case, First Security was required to furnish
marketable title as a condition precedent to its right to demand
that Kelley tender the down payment specified in the Agreement.
The fact that First Security was unable to furnish the title
called

for

performance.

by

the

Agreement

excused

Kelley's

tender

of

King v. Allen, 398 N.E.2d 510 (Mass. App. Ct.

1980).
As in Huck v. Hayes, the delays in closing were solely
due to First Security in its pursuit of the quiet title action
against the Armstrongs so that it could fulfill its obligations
under the Agreement.

When First Security finally decided in

early September that it no longer wished to sell the property
to Kelley, it demanded that Kelley perform within an unreasonably
short period of time; then, when Kelley was unable to meet First
Security's arbitrarily imposed deadline, First Security declared
that Kelley

had

failed

to perform and that it would not,

therefore, go through with the sale.

"One party to a contract

cannot by willful [sic] act or omission make it impossible or
difficult for the other to perform and then invoke the other's
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non-performance as a defense."

Ferris v. Jennings, 595 P. 2d

857, 859 (Utah 1979).
In this case, the failure of First Security to provide
marketable title prevents it from complaining about Kelley's
performance.

Kelley's only "failure" was his unwillingness to

meet defendant's September 22, 1987, deadline.

Despite First

Security's unreasonable notice and the problems surrounding title
to the Property, Kelley remained ready, willing and able to
perform under the contract and did in fact place funds in an
account in Williamsburg Savings Bank in Salt Lake City, to be
used for the down payment, which funds were shortly thereafter
placed into an interest-bearing account with the Clerk of the
Court.
Moreover, Kelley's September 22, 1987 letter was not
conditional.
agreed:

It merely demanded that First Security perform as

convey marketable title to the Property and the water

rights that both First Security and Kelley intended and agreed
would be conveyed.

(See R.l-62, Complaint dated September 22,

1987, entitled William Kelley v. First Security Mortgage

Co..

Civil No. 9532 filed concurrent with the September 22, 1987,
letter to First Security's counsel.)
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VI.
KELLEY IS ENTITLED TO SPECIFIC PERFORMANCE
WITH RESPECT TO THE INTEREST WHICH
FIRST SECURITY CAN TRANSFER
In Reed v. Alvev, 610 P. 2d 1374 (Utah 1980), the Utah
Supreme Court stated the rule regarding the availability of
specific performance as a remedy:
Generally, in a suit for specific performance
of a contract for the sale of realty, the
purchaser must show that he paid the purchase
price, or tendered it, to the defendant prior
to the commencement of the suit. However,
an action for specific performance may also
be maintained if the plaintiff presents an
excuse for his failure to make such payment
or tender and avers his ability, readiness
and willingness to pay the contract amount.
Id. at 1379.
In Reed v. Alvey, the purchaser agreed to purchase
commercial property on which the vendor was constructing a fourplex.

After signing a standard form earnest money agreement

and offer to purchase, the vendor obtained construction financing
and began building the four-plex.

Construction continued over

the next eleven months, which the purchaser regularly monitored.
The

purchaser

complained

several

times

construction efforts of the defendants.

about

the

dilatory

Finally, the purchaser

received a letter from the defendants informing him that the
property would be available for closing in two or three weeks.
The vendor also requested that the purchaser deposit $13,500.00
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into an escrow account.

Although disputing the necessity of

depositing this money under the terms of their cigreement, the
purchaser complied; however, construction again slowed and the
plaintiff removed the money from the non-interest bearing escrow
account.

During this period the purchaser tried repeatedly to

communicate with the vendor, but was unsuccessful.

Eventually,

the purchaser brought an action for specific performance.
The Court, in concluding that the plaintiff could
maintain an action for specific performance, stated as follows:
In the present case the payment of the
purchase price was contingent upon the
completion of the construction of the fourplex unit. Since, prior to the institution
of this suit, the defendants had failed to
complete construction, the plaintiff was
under no obligation to tender the full
purchase amount prior to the present
litigation.
The plaintiff's ability and
willingness to tender the purchase amount as
averred in his complaint is sufficient to
support a suit for specific performance of
the contract in this situation.
Id. at 1379.
Because the vendor had subsequently encumbered the land,
the Court required that the vendor remove the encumbrance prior
to the purchaser taking possession of the property.
stated that:
This can be accomplished either by a reduction
in the purchase price, in the amount of the
encumbrance, or payment of the total price
after defendants remove the encumbrance.
Id. at 1380.
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The Court

Even though First Security could not convey the quality
of title called for by the Agreement, it was obligated to convey
title and abate the purchase price. Where a vendor of real estate
cannot convey all that he contracted to convey in an earnest
money agreement, the purchaser has the right to insist upon
performance by the vendor to the extent the latter is able to
perform with an abatement in the purchase price equal to the
value of the deficiency or defect. Castagno v. Church, 552 P.2d
1282 (Utah 1976) .
In Castagno, the defendants, vendors, had agreed to
convey 40 acres of land, together with all water rights, including
one-second foot of water in and to a well.

However, the vendors

were unable to procure water rights for the well.

The real

property had a value of $1,500.00 per acre if one-second foot
of water was available, but without water, its value was only
$500.00 per acre.
The trial court ordered conveyance of the property
with a rebate on the purchase price and the Utah Supreme Court
rejected the vendors' argument that they should not have to convey
since the purpose of the contract had been frustrated because
of the defendants' inability to convey the water rights.

The

Court stated that the purchasers were entitled to specific
performance and an abatement in the purchase price equal to the
value of the deficiency or defect.

-41-

See, also. Reed v. Alvey,

610 P.2d at 1380; Atkin v. Cobb, 663 S.W.2d 48 (Tex. Ct. App.
1983) .
Kelley was entitled to specific performance of the
Agreement on the ground that he not only tendered the required
down payment to the defendant within a reasonable time after
being informed that the defendant desired to close by September
15, 1987, even though the tender was unnecessary, but he also
was ready, willing and able to perform in a timely fashion.
By its conduct, First Security waived timely performance under
the Agreement and could not then set an unreasonable deadline
and fault Kelley for untimely performance.
Even if Kelley7s tender of performance was found to
be untimely, any such defect is excused under the rule enunciated
in Reed v. Alvey. Thus, Kelley need not have performed according
to the terms of the Agreement since Kelley was ready, willing
and able to perform but was delayed and, therefore, excused by
First Security's conduct. Any delay in tendering the down payment
was fully justified under the circumstances, and Leucadia cannot
now attempt to charge Kelley with non-performance.

In sum,

Kelley was entitled to specific performance since he performed
his obligations under the Agreement within a reasonable period
of time, his performance was excused since he was ready, willing
and able to perform but was prevented from doing so by the
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defendant or his tender was effective to put First Security in
breach.
CONCLUSION
Based upon the arguments s£t forth above, and the cases
cited therein, this Court should affirm the trial court's Partial
Summary Judgment granting Kelley a decree of specific performance
on the grounds that, based upon the undisputed facts, Kelley's
tender of performance was neither untimely nor defective and/or
was unnecessary.

Consequently, Kelley was entitled to specific

performance as a matter of law.
Dated this

£/

day of January, 1989.

SEN, Esq.
CHARLES P./SAMPSON, Esq.
CLAUDIA F. BERRY, Esq.
SUITTER AXLAND ARMSTRONG & HANSON
Attorneys for Respondent

(Original Signature)
DAVID R. OLSEN, Esq.
CHARLES P. SAMPSON, Esq.
CLAUDIA F. BERRY, Esq.
SUITTER AXLAND ARMSTRONG & HANSON
Attorneys for Respondent
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SPECIAL WARRANTY DEED
FIRST SECURITY MORTGAGE COMPANY, a corporation organized and
existing under the laws of the State of Utah, with its principal
office at Salt Lake City, of County of Salt Lake, State of Utah,
grantor, hereby CONVEYS AND WARRANTS against all claiming by,
through or under it to WILLIAM R. KELLEY, JR., grantee, of
P. 0. Box 257, Hull, Massachusetts 02045, for the sum of TEN AND
NO/100 DOLLARS and other consideration, the following described
tracts of land in Summrnit County, State of Utah:
See Exhibit "A" attached hereto and by this
reference incorporated herein and made a part
hereof.
Grantor makes no warranty as to the effect of any of the following:
1.

An action pending in the District Court of the Third
Judicial District in and for the County of Summit,
State of Utah, entitled First Security Moctgage
Company, a Utah corporation (successor in interest
to R E H, Incorporated), Plaintiff, vs. Hebert S.
Armstrong, William Melbourne Armstrong, Jr.,
Joseph F. Ringholz and Raye C. Ringholz Defendants,
and filed as Civil No. 9447, records of Summit
County, Utah.
Lis Pendens in said action was recorded on July 10,
1987, as Entry No. 273994, in Book 438, at Page 20,
records of Summit County, Utah.
An action pending in the District Court of the Third
Judicial District, in and for the County of Summit,
State of Utah, entitled William R. Kelley, Jr.,
Plaintiff, vs. First Security Mortgage Company, a
Utah corporation, et al., Defendant, filed as Civil
No. 9532, records of Summit County, Utah. (See copy
of complaint for purpose of action.)

Lis Pendens in said action was recorded
September 22, 1987, as Entry No. 277037, in Book
445, at page 193, records of Summit County, Utah.
3,

A Special Warranty Deed executed in favor of
Leucadia Financial Corporation, dated November 25,
1987, recorded November 30, 1987, as Entry No.
280465, in Book 454, at Page 217, records of Summit
County, Utah.

4.

A Quit-Claim Deed executed in favor of Leucadia
Financial Corporation, dated November 25, 1987,
recorded November 30, 1987, as Entry No- 280466, in
Book 454, at Page 220, records of Summit County,
Utah.

The officer who signs this deed hereby certifies that
this deed and the transfer represented thereby was duly authorized
by the grantor.
In witness whereof, the grantor has executed this deed as
of this 6th day of May, 1988.
FIRST SECURITY MORTGAGE CORPORATION

By:
Its:

Jn*T~ S />.

STATE OF UTAH

)
: ss.
COUNTY OF SALT LAKE)
i
On cne
the t>cn
6th aay
day of May, 1988, personally appeared before
i
on
me Uj^^puL
L. L&~Ct^
, who being by me duly sworn, did say,
that
it he^is the
the /fasfcd.P*
/fa^"^,^
of First Security Mortgage Company, and
that: said instrument wa:
was signed in behalf of said corporation by
lority of
t s bylaws or
i t s board of directors,
authority
of iits
or a
a resolution of
of its
a i d (Jv£L**r*ju U La~it*y
and ssaid
acknowledged to me that said
corporation
same
)orat ion executed the
the same.

^ <^iZf4#\
My^G§y1j^s^pAv'Ek^res:

'Notary P u b l i c r ~ J . ,
Residing at ^ztM— 6 m

~
, ,
^ 7 / Lll^Uc

EXHIBIT "A" TO SPECIAL WARRANTY DEED

The real property is located in Summit County, State of Utah.
.Said real property is also described as follows:
Parcel No, 1: Beginning at a point South 2630.74 feet and West
2776,80 feet from the northeast corner of Section 8, Township 2
South, Range 4 East, Salt Lake Base and Meridian, and running
thence South 4 degrees 03' East 421.40 feet; thence South 56
degrees 22' West 261.80 feet; thence South 50 degrees 52f West
278.0 feet; thence South 47 degrees 34' West 500.0 feet; thence
North 28 degrees 34' West 538.0 feet to the center line of a
ditch; thence North 53 degrees 10' East 36.0 feet along said
ditch to an old spring; thence North 40 degrees East 181.0
feet; thence North 71 degrees East 87.0 feet; thence North 66
degrees 38' East 147.61 feet; thence North 30 degrees 35' East
43.50 feet; thence East 111.0 feet; thence North 45 degrees
East 86.0 feet; thence North 37 degrees 38' East 125.0 feet;
thence North 59 degrees 50' East 207.0 fpet; thence South 67
degrees 05' East 23.0 feet; thence North 37 degrees 55' East
55.0 feet; thence North 34 degrees 15' East 75.0 feet; thence
last 43.82 feet; thence South 37.0 feet; thence South 88
degrees 25f East 77.0 feet to the point of beginning.
PARCEL NO. 2: Beginning at a point South 2630.74 feet and West
1776.80 feet from the Northeast corner of Section 8, Township 2
South, Range 4 East, Salt Lake Base and Meridian, and running
rhence South 4 degrees 03f East 421.40 feet; thence North 53
iegrees 40f East 112.67 feet; thence North 0 degrees 53' East
154.74 feet; thence South 89 degrees 30' West 126.00 feet to
:he point of beginning.
'0GETHER WITH a right-of-way for ingress to and egress from
>arcel No. 1 and Parcel No. 2 over a roadway which is
.pproximately three rods wide, the centerline of which is more
particularly described as follows:
ECINNING AT a point South 2607.61 feet and West 2853.77 feet
rota the Northeast corner of Section 8, Township 2 South, Range
East, Salt Lake Base and Meridian, and running thence .South

89 degrees 36' East, 2597.86 feet, more or less, to the center
of the state highway.
LESS AND EXCEPTING from Parcel No. 1 and Parcel No. 2, the
following:
BEGINNING AT a point South 2615.05 feet and West 2724.10 feet
from the Northeast corner of Section 8, Township 2 South, Range
4 East, Salt Lake Base and Meridian, said point also being on a
fence line and running thence South 1 degree 24f14,f West along
said fence line 151.84 feet; thence North 88 degrees 25' West
132.89 feet; 'thence North 0 degrees 16f West 150.00 feet;
thence South 88 degrees 25* East 84.595 feet; thence North 89
degrees 30' East 52.69 feet to the point of beginning.
SUBJECT TO easements, restrictions, and rights of way appearing
of record.
ALSO SUBJECT TO the lien of general property taxes after
January 1, 1988.
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STATE OF UTAH

)

County of Summit

)

). Alan Spriggs, County Recorder in and for Summit County. State of Utah,
'.'> hereby certify that the attached and foregoing is a full, true and correct copy
u mat certain
J

which appears of record m my office in Book ^/7^7
bang Entry No. ^ 3
JSjLjS

. Page *£S3 ~ -* ^

IN WITNESS WHEREOF. I have hereunto set my hand and affixed my
official seal, this
,y day of Y/jj^/,
/~jff

-.'

WHEN RECORDED, MAIL TO:

I

290224

David R. O l s e n , E s q .

SUMMIT COUNTY TIT; e
£"\''u I o p«. o. i n
Space AboW'foV Recorder's Use

P. Q. Box 1168
Salt Lake City, UT 84110

Quit-Claim Deed

i,-r,^/°_J^_

FIRST SECURITY MORTGAGE COMPANY, a corporation organized
and existing under the laws of the State of Utah, with its
principal office at Salt Lake City, of County of Salt Lake, State
of Utah, grantor, hereby QUIT CLAIMS to WILLIAM R. KELLEY, JR., an
individual, grantee, of P. 0- Box 257, Hull, Massachusetts 02045,
for the sum of TEN AND NO/100 DOLLARS and other consideration, the
following described tracts of land in Summit County, State of Utah:
See Exhibit "A" attached hereto and by this
reference incorporated herein and made a part
hereof.
The officer who signs this deed hereby certifies that
this deed and the transfer represented thereby was duly authorized
by the grantor.
In witness whereof, the grantor has executed this deed as
of this 6th day of May, 1988.
FIRST SECURITY MORTGAGE COMPANY

By
Its

^L~

^^^~

9

^jr-S^S

^

STATE OF UTAH

)
: ss.
COUNTY OF SALT LAKE)
.

On the 6th day of May, 1988, personally appeared before
me (JS&OYU<-*> C&?' ^^f^M
'w h o being by me duly sworn, did
say, that/he is the /fe$A U.K
of First Security Mortgage
Company, and that said instrument was signed in behalf of said
corporation by authority of its .bylaws or a/resolution
of its
board of directors, and said /uJci^pM^
L- L<2*<JmX acknowledged to
me that said corporation execu t ed she same.

£@3$\
<$>%

/Hb^X
<X^k ^ ,
Notary Public- /, -^
L

y yj_

EXHIBIT "A" TO QUITCLAIM DEED

The real property is located in Summit County, State of Utah.
Said real property is also described as follows:
Beginning at a point South 2615.05 feet and West 2724.10 feet
from the Northeast corner of Section 8, Township 2 South, Range
4 East, Salt Lake Base and Meridian, and running thence North
89°30,0O" East 73.31 feet; thence South 00a53'00" West 369.97
feet; thence South 53 o 40 , 00" West 112.67 feet; thence South
56°22'00" West 261.80 feet; thence South 50 o 52 , 00 M West 278.0
feet; thence South 47°34'00" West 500.00 feet; thence North
28o34'00M West 550.31 feet to the center line of a ditch;
thence North 53°10'00" East 43.37 feet along said ditch to an
old spring; thence along said centerline of ditch the following
twelve courses: thence 1) North 40°00'00" East 181.00 feet;
thence 2) North 71o00'00,, East 87.00. feet; thence 3) North
66o38,00,* East 147.61 feet; thence 4) North 30°35,00" East
43.50 feet; thence 5) East 111.00 feet; thence 6) North
45°00'00M East 86.00 feet; thence 7) North 37 o 38 , 00" East
125.00 feet; thence 8) North 59°50,00" East 207.00 feet; thence
9) South 67°05'00" East 23.00 feet; thence 10) North 37°55"00"
East 55.00 feet; thence 11) North 34°15'00" East 75.00 feet;
thence 12) East 43.82 feet; thence South 37.00 feet; thence
North 88°25'00" West 7.60 feet; thence South 00°16'00" East
150.00 feet; thence South 88°25'00" East 132.89 feet; thence
North 01°24'14" East 151.84 feet to the point of beginning.
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